The New York Times
September 16, 2011
Dutch to Ban Full-Face Veils
By REUTERS
AMSTERDAM (Reuters) — The Dutch government said Friday that it would ban face-covering veils worn by some Muslim women because the garments flout the Dutch way of life and culture.
Prime Minister Mark Rutte also announced tougher rules for immigrants and asylum-seekers who want to pursue Dutch nationality; in the future, he said, they will have to show that they have income and that they have not received financial assistance or benefits for at least three years.
The country’s reputation as relatively tolerant and open to immigration has changed over the last decade, reflecting voters’ concerns over a large influx of Muslim immigrants.
“The government believes the wearing of clothing that completely or almost entirely covers the face is fundamentally at odds with public life, where people are recognized by their faces,” the government said in a statement.
The new measures reflect the influence wielded by Geert Wilders, a populist politician whose anti-Islam, anti-immigration Freedom Party is the third-largest in the Dutch Parliament.
The government contended that the ban on face-covering veils did not represent a restriction on religious freedom, but that even if it was, it was “necessary and justified in the interest of protecting the character and way of life in the Netherlands.”
Niqabs, which leave the eyes uncovered, and burqas, which cover the face with a cloth grid, are far less commonly seen on the streets of the Netherlands than hijabs, or head scarves, which leave the face exposed.
sábado, 17 de septiembre de 2011
Pena de Muerte y Discriminación Racial Hoy en en New York Times
The New York Times
16 de Septiembre de 2011
Editorial
Estado de Ejecución
Después de declarar el “estado de ejecución de Duane Buck a sólo horas de ser ejecutado en Texas el Jueves, la Corte Suprema debe ahora revisar el caso o, por lo menos, ordenar que un tribunal federal inferior considere el pedido del Sr. Buck de una nueva audiencia antes de decidir su sentencia. El Tribunal no puede permitir que tenga lugar una terrible injusticia.
El Sr. Buck, un Afro-Americano, fue condenado a muerte en 1997. En la etapa de sentencia de su juicio, un psicólogo que participaba como perito experto dijo que “sí” cuando se le pregunto si “el factor raza, negra”, icrementaba las chances de que el Sr. Buck pudiera llevar a cabo de nuevo una conducta peligrosa.
En Texas, esta es una pregunta clave: si si el estado no prueba “la peligrosidad futura” más alla de la duda razonable, no puede sentenciar al imputado a muerte. La fiscalía obtuvo la respuesta que quería y urgió al jurado a basar la decisión en ese testimonio. El jurado sentenció al Sr. Buck a muerte.
En el año 2000, el Senador John Cornyn, que era entonces el Jefe de los Abogados del estado de Texas, solicitó nuevas audiencias de sentencia en seis casos en los que se había condenado a muerte –incluuido el Sr. Buck- porque la raza de los imputados se había utilizado inapropiadamente como un factor relevante para obtener esa sentencia.
El Sr. Buck es el único de ese grupo al que no se le concedió una nueva audiencia. El Abogado de Distrito a cargo del caso del Sr. Buck reusó admitir que el uso de la raza fue un error constitucional que requería una nueva audiciencia. Cuando el caso llegó al juzgado federal, había un nuevo Jefe de Abogados del Estado de Texas, y éste se reusó a obedecer el juicio del Sr. Cornyn.
El claro racismo que tuvo lugar en el caso del Sr. Buck es una nueva prueba de que la pena de muerte es cruel e inusual porque es arbitraria y discriminatoria, además de bárbara, y debe ser abolida.
La traducción es mía. La versión original en inglés está abajo.
The New York Times
September 16, 2011
Stay of Execution
After granting a stay of execution to Duane Buck just hours before he was to be put to death in Texas on Thursday, the Supreme Court must now review the case or, at the very least, order a lower federal court to consider Mr. Buck’s plea for a new sentencing hearing. It cannot allow a terrible injustice to stand.
Mr. Buck, an African-American, was convicted of murder in 1997. At the sentencing phase of his trial, a psychologist who was an expert witness said “yes” when asked if “the race factor, black,” increased the chances that Mr. Buck would do something dangerous again.
In Texas, this is a pivotal question: if the state does not prove “future dangerousness” beyond a reasonable doubt, it cannot sentence a convict to death. The prosecution got the answer it wanted and urged the jury to rely on this testimony. The jury sentenced Mr. Buck to death.
In 2000, Senator John Cornyn, who was then the Texas attorney general, called for new sentencing hearings for six men given the death penalty — including Mr. Buck — because race was improperly used as a factor in their sentencing.
Mr. Buck is the only one who has not been granted a new sentencing hearing. The state district attorney in charge in Mr. Buck’s case refused to admit that the use of race was a constitutional error that required a new hearing. By the time the case got to federal court, there was a new Texas attorney general who refused to abide by Mr. Cornyn’s judgment.
The gross racism in Mr. Buck’s case is proof again that the death penalty is cruel and unusual because it is arbitrary and discriminatory, as well as barbaric, and must be abolished.
16 de Septiembre de 2011
Editorial
Estado de Ejecución
Después de declarar el “estado de ejecución de Duane Buck a sólo horas de ser ejecutado en Texas el Jueves, la Corte Suprema debe ahora revisar el caso o, por lo menos, ordenar que un tribunal federal inferior considere el pedido del Sr. Buck de una nueva audiencia antes de decidir su sentencia. El Tribunal no puede permitir que tenga lugar una terrible injusticia.
El Sr. Buck, un Afro-Americano, fue condenado a muerte en 1997. En la etapa de sentencia de su juicio, un psicólogo que participaba como perito experto dijo que “sí” cuando se le pregunto si “el factor raza, negra”, icrementaba las chances de que el Sr. Buck pudiera llevar a cabo de nuevo una conducta peligrosa.
En Texas, esta es una pregunta clave: si si el estado no prueba “la peligrosidad futura” más alla de la duda razonable, no puede sentenciar al imputado a muerte. La fiscalía obtuvo la respuesta que quería y urgió al jurado a basar la decisión en ese testimonio. El jurado sentenció al Sr. Buck a muerte.
En el año 2000, el Senador John Cornyn, que era entonces el Jefe de los Abogados del estado de Texas, solicitó nuevas audiencias de sentencia en seis casos en los que se había condenado a muerte –incluuido el Sr. Buck- porque la raza de los imputados se había utilizado inapropiadamente como un factor relevante para obtener esa sentencia.
El Sr. Buck es el único de ese grupo al que no se le concedió una nueva audiencia. El Abogado de Distrito a cargo del caso del Sr. Buck reusó admitir que el uso de la raza fue un error constitucional que requería una nueva audiciencia. Cuando el caso llegó al juzgado federal, había un nuevo Jefe de Abogados del Estado de Texas, y éste se reusó a obedecer el juicio del Sr. Cornyn.
El claro racismo que tuvo lugar en el caso del Sr. Buck es una nueva prueba de que la pena de muerte es cruel e inusual porque es arbitraria y discriminatoria, además de bárbara, y debe ser abolida.
La traducción es mía. La versión original en inglés está abajo.
The New York Times
September 16, 2011
Stay of Execution
After granting a stay of execution to Duane Buck just hours before he was to be put to death in Texas on Thursday, the Supreme Court must now review the case or, at the very least, order a lower federal court to consider Mr. Buck’s plea for a new sentencing hearing. It cannot allow a terrible injustice to stand.
Mr. Buck, an African-American, was convicted of murder in 1997. At the sentencing phase of his trial, a psychologist who was an expert witness said “yes” when asked if “the race factor, black,” increased the chances that Mr. Buck would do something dangerous again.
In Texas, this is a pivotal question: if the state does not prove “future dangerousness” beyond a reasonable doubt, it cannot sentence a convict to death. The prosecution got the answer it wanted and urged the jury to rely on this testimony. The jury sentenced Mr. Buck to death.
In 2000, Senator John Cornyn, who was then the Texas attorney general, called for new sentencing hearings for six men given the death penalty — including Mr. Buck — because race was improperly used as a factor in their sentencing.
Mr. Buck is the only one who has not been granted a new sentencing hearing. The state district attorney in charge in Mr. Buck’s case refused to admit that the use of race was a constitutional error that required a new hearing. By the time the case got to federal court, there was a new Texas attorney general who refused to abide by Mr. Cornyn’s judgment.
The gross racism in Mr. Buck’s case is proof again that the death penalty is cruel and unusual because it is arbitrary and discriminatory, as well as barbaric, and must be abolished.
domingo, 28 de agosto de 2011
The New York Times
August 27, 2011
Ugly? You May Have a Case
By DANIEL S. HAMERMESH
Daniel S. Hamermesh, a professor of economics at the University of Texas, Austin, is the author of "Beauty Pays," published this month.
BEING good-looking is useful in so many ways.
In addition to whatever personal pleasure it gives you, being attractive also helps you earn more money, find a higher-earning spouse (and one who looks better, too!) and get better deals on mortgages. Each of these facts has been demonstrated over the past 20 years by many economists and other researchers. The effects are not small: one study showed that an American worker who was among the bottom one-seventh in looks, as assessed by randomly chosen observers, earned 10 to 15 percent less per year than a similar worker whose looks were assessed in the top one-third — a lifetime difference, in a typical case, of about $230,000.
Beauty is as much an issue for men as for women. While extensive research shows that women’s looks have bigger impacts in the market for mates, another large group of studies demonstrates that men’s looks have bigger impacts on the job.
Why this disparate treatment of looks in so many areas of life? It’s a matter of simple prejudice. Most of us, regardless of our professed attitudes, prefer as customers to buy from better-looking salespeople, as jurors to listen to better-looking attorneys, as voters to be led by better-looking politicians, as students to learn from better-looking professors. This is not a matter of evil employers’ refusing to hire the ugly: in our roles as workers, customers and potential lovers we are all responsible for these effects.
How could we remedy this injustice? With all the gains to being good-looking, you would think that more people would get plastic surgery or makeovers to improve their looks. Many of us do all those things, but as studies have shown, such refinements make only small differences in our beauty. All that spending may make us feel better, but it doesn’t help us much in getting a better job or a more desirable mate.
A more radical solution may be needed: why not offer legal protections to the ugly, as we do with racial, ethnic and religious minorities, women and handicapped individuals?
We actually already do offer such protections in a few places, including in some jurisdictions in California, and in the District of Columbia, where discriminatory treatment based on looks in hiring, promotions, housing and other areas is prohibited. Ugliness could be protected generally in the United States by small extensions of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Ugly people could be allowed to seek help from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other agencies in overcoming the effects of discrimination. We could even have affirmative-action programs for the ugly.
The mechanics of legislating this kind of protection are not as difficult as you might think. You might argue that people can’t be classified by their looks — that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. That aphorism is correct in one sense: if asked who is the most beautiful person in a group of beautiful people, you and I might well have different answers. But when it comes to differentiating classes of attractiveness, we all view beauty similarly: someone whom you consider good-looking will be viewed similarly by most others; someone you consider ugly will be viewed as ugly by most others. In one study, more than half of a group of people were assessed identically by each of two observers using a five-point scale; and very few assessments differed by more than one point.
For purposes of administering a law, we surely could agree on who is truly ugly, perhaps the worst-looking 1 or 2 percent of the population. The difficulties in classification are little greater than those faced in deciding who qualifies for protection on grounds of disabilities that limit the activities of daily life, as shown by conflicting decisions in numerous legal cases involving obesity.
There are other possible objections. “Ugliness” is not a personal trait that many people choose to embrace; those whom we classify as protected might not be willing to admit that they are ugly. But with the chance of obtaining extra pay and promotions amounting to $230,000 in lost lifetime earnings, there’s a large enough incentive to do so. Bringing anti-discrimination lawsuits is also costly, and few potential plaintiffs could afford to do so. But many attorneys would be willing to organize classes of plaintiffs to overcome these costs, just as they now do in racial-discrimination and other lawsuits.
Economic arguments for protecting the ugly are as strong as those for protecting some groups currently covered by legislation. So why not go ahead and expand protection to the looks-challenged? There’s one legitimate concern. With increasingly tight limits on government resources, expanding rights to yet another protected group would reduce protection for groups that have commanded our legislative and other attention for over 50 years.
We face a trade-off: ignore a deserving group of citizens, or help them but limit help available for other groups. Even though I myself have demonstrated the disadvantages of ugliness in 20 years of research, I nonetheless would hate to see anything that might reduce assistance to groups now aided by protective legislation.
You might reasonably disagree and argue for protecting all deserving groups. Either way, you shouldn’t be surprised to see the United States heading toward this new legal frontier.
August 27, 2011
Ugly? You May Have a Case
By DANIEL S. HAMERMESH
Daniel S. Hamermesh, a professor of economics at the University of Texas, Austin, is the author of "Beauty Pays," published this month.
BEING good-looking is useful in so many ways.
In addition to whatever personal pleasure it gives you, being attractive also helps you earn more money, find a higher-earning spouse (and one who looks better, too!) and get better deals on mortgages. Each of these facts has been demonstrated over the past 20 years by many economists and other researchers. The effects are not small: one study showed that an American worker who was among the bottom one-seventh in looks, as assessed by randomly chosen observers, earned 10 to 15 percent less per year than a similar worker whose looks were assessed in the top one-third — a lifetime difference, in a typical case, of about $230,000.
Beauty is as much an issue for men as for women. While extensive research shows that women’s looks have bigger impacts in the market for mates, another large group of studies demonstrates that men’s looks have bigger impacts on the job.
Why this disparate treatment of looks in so many areas of life? It’s a matter of simple prejudice. Most of us, regardless of our professed attitudes, prefer as customers to buy from better-looking salespeople, as jurors to listen to better-looking attorneys, as voters to be led by better-looking politicians, as students to learn from better-looking professors. This is not a matter of evil employers’ refusing to hire the ugly: in our roles as workers, customers and potential lovers we are all responsible for these effects.
How could we remedy this injustice? With all the gains to being good-looking, you would think that more people would get plastic surgery or makeovers to improve their looks. Many of us do all those things, but as studies have shown, such refinements make only small differences in our beauty. All that spending may make us feel better, but it doesn’t help us much in getting a better job or a more desirable mate.
A more radical solution may be needed: why not offer legal protections to the ugly, as we do with racial, ethnic and religious minorities, women and handicapped individuals?
We actually already do offer such protections in a few places, including in some jurisdictions in California, and in the District of Columbia, where discriminatory treatment based on looks in hiring, promotions, housing and other areas is prohibited. Ugliness could be protected generally in the United States by small extensions of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Ugly people could be allowed to seek help from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other agencies in overcoming the effects of discrimination. We could even have affirmative-action programs for the ugly.
The mechanics of legislating this kind of protection are not as difficult as you might think. You might argue that people can’t be classified by their looks — that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. That aphorism is correct in one sense: if asked who is the most beautiful person in a group of beautiful people, you and I might well have different answers. But when it comes to differentiating classes of attractiveness, we all view beauty similarly: someone whom you consider good-looking will be viewed similarly by most others; someone you consider ugly will be viewed as ugly by most others. In one study, more than half of a group of people were assessed identically by each of two observers using a five-point scale; and very few assessments differed by more than one point.
For purposes of administering a law, we surely could agree on who is truly ugly, perhaps the worst-looking 1 or 2 percent of the population. The difficulties in classification are little greater than those faced in deciding who qualifies for protection on grounds of disabilities that limit the activities of daily life, as shown by conflicting decisions in numerous legal cases involving obesity.
There are other possible objections. “Ugliness” is not a personal trait that many people choose to embrace; those whom we classify as protected might not be willing to admit that they are ugly. But with the chance of obtaining extra pay and promotions amounting to $230,000 in lost lifetime earnings, there’s a large enough incentive to do so. Bringing anti-discrimination lawsuits is also costly, and few potential plaintiffs could afford to do so. But many attorneys would be willing to organize classes of plaintiffs to overcome these costs, just as they now do in racial-discrimination and other lawsuits.
Economic arguments for protecting the ugly are as strong as those for protecting some groups currently covered by legislation. So why not go ahead and expand protection to the looks-challenged? There’s one legitimate concern. With increasingly tight limits on government resources, expanding rights to yet another protected group would reduce protection for groups that have commanded our legislative and other attention for over 50 years.
We face a trade-off: ignore a deserving group of citizens, or help them but limit help available for other groups. Even though I myself have demonstrated the disadvantages of ugliness in 20 years of research, I nonetheless would hate to see anything that might reduce assistance to groups now aided by protective legislation.
You might reasonably disagree and argue for protecting all deserving groups. Either way, you shouldn’t be surprised to see the United States heading toward this new legal frontier.
sábado, 20 de agosto de 2011
BIENVENIDOS/AS!!!
Bienvenidos al Blog del Curso de Igualdad Constitucional de Roberto Saba. Aquí encontrarán materiales e información útil referida a las lecturas obligatorias y opcionales para las clases.
Les sugiero que se suscriban para que reciban alertas sobre nuevos posts.
Saludos,
Roberto Saba
Les sugiero que se suscriban para que reciban alertas sobre nuevos posts.
Saludos,
Roberto Saba
Suscribirse a:
Entradas (Atom)